Torts—Negligence—Liability to Trespassing Children by Baumfalk, Bob
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 1 Article 11
1955
Torts—Negligence—Liability to Trespassing
Children
Bob Baumfalk
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Bob Baumfalk, Torts—Negligence—Liability to Trespassing Children, 35 Neb. L. Rev. 131 (1956)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol35/iss1/11
CASENOTES 
TORT~NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY TO TRESPASSING 
CHILDREN 
131 
Plaintiff, an eleven year old boy, was injured when a lumber 
pile on which he was playing collapsed. The lumber had been 
ordered by a contractor and had been piled on the building site 
by a lumber dealer. The lumber, which allegedly resembled a 
boat to the plaintiff, was near two public alleys which bordered 
the building site. The plaintiff brought an action for injuries 
under the attractive nuisance doctrine against both the contractor 
and the lumber dealer. Held: Even though the lumber dealer had 
neither possession or control of the premises, he owed a duty to 
trespassing children not to create an attractive, dangerous situa-
tion; and liability should be determined by the jury under the 
ordinary rules of negligence.1 
The instant case is the first in which liability has been im-
posed upon a lumber dealer under this type of factual situation.2 
However, the opinion of the court is not too clear as to the prin-
ciples upon which liability was predicated. A plaintiff in another 
case was denied recovery against a lumber dealer under an 
almost identical factual situation because the dealer was allowed 
to take advantage of the fact of the trespass for relief from 
liability.3 In the instant case the court rejected the contention 
lKahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill.2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955), 
reversing, 1 Ill . .App.2d 370, 117 N.E.2d 670 (1954) which is noted in 
32 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 348 (1954). It should be noted that the court stated 
by dictum that the attractive nuisance doctrine and its requirement that 
the child be lured onto the land by the attractive object was no longer 
applicable to the contractor as a possessor of the land. .Attractiveness 
was important only in determining foreseeability, and liability was to be 
determined by the jury by the ordinary rules of negligence. This view 
is in conformity with the more modern view adopted by the Restatement. 
Torts § 339 (1934). The gradual acceptance of this position has tended 
to clarify the basis for imposing liability for injuries sustained by tres-
passing children. Grimmestad v. Rose Brothers, Inc., 194 Minn. 531, 261 
N.W. 194 (1935); Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 10 N.J. Super. 
486, 77 .A.2d 502 (1950); Eaton v. R.B. George Investments, Inc., 152 
Tex. 523, 260 S.W.2d 587 (1953). See Fleming, Tort Liability of Oc-
cupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 Yale L.J. 144, 161 
(1953); Prosser, Torts §§ 77, 620 (1st ed. 1941). 
2 "No cases have been cited, nor have I found any, wherein the stand-
ard of conduct binding a supplier of lumber has been held to impose 
upon him an obligation to any more than was done by the lumber com-
pany in this case." Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill.2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 
836, 843 (1955) (dissenting opinion). Research by the author has also 
failed to produce any such case. 
3 Morris v. Lewis Mfg. Co., 331 l\Iich. 252, 49 N.W.2d 164. 28 .A.L.R.2d 
214 (1951). 
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that since the dealer was neither in control nor possession of the 
premises, he owed no duty to anyone other than the owner or 
the contractor. The court, citing Stedwell v. Chicago,4 said that 
as to the dealer, the child is not a trespasser. Coinciding with the 
weight of authority, the Stedwell case is one in which persons 
maintaining electrical lines over property have not been allowed to 
take advantage of the defense of the injured child's trespass. In 
those cases the duties of the possessor of land and the negligent 
party have been decided independently. The duty of the possessor 
of land is decided according to the attractive nuisance rule of the 
jurisdiction, and the duty of the negligent party is decided ac-
cording to whether or not it was foreseeable that harm would 
come to the injured child. 5 The test as to negligence is merely 
whether or not the party was negligent in stringing its wires 
where it had reason to believe it would imperil the lives of child-
ren.6 
The failure to decide the duties of the possessor of the land 
and the negligent party independently has led to criticism of the 
contrary result.7 Although the instant case lacked the highly 
dangerous nature of electricity and the element of control found 
in the electrical cases, the court applied the same test: 
. . . whether the lumber company in the exercise of ordinary 
care could reasonably have anticipated the likelihood that child-
ren would climb onto the lumber and would be injured if it were 
not securely piled.S 
Thus it is the foreseeability of harm which serves as the basis for 
the imposition of a duty of ordinary care. 
The absence of control or possession is not a defense when 
liability is sought to be imposed upon the breach of a common 
law duty which a seller owes to anyone whom he has reason to 
believe will come into contact with the article sold, where he 
knows, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence should know, that 
the article he is delivering is in an imminently dangerous or de-
fective condition.9 In such case he is liable to any person, or 
4 297 Ill. 486, 130 N.E. 729, 17 A.L.R. 829 (1921). 
GSee cases collected, Annot., 56 A.L.R. 1021, 1030 (1928). 
6 Edwards v. Kansas City, 104 Kan. 684, 180 Pac. 271 (1919); see 
.Annot., 17 A.L.R. 833, 849 (1922). 
71\IcCaffrey v. Concord Electric Co., 80 N.H. 45, 114 Atl. 395 (1921); 
see Annot., 17 A.L.R. 833, 849 (1922). 
s Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill.2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 836, 840 (1955). 
9 See Annot., 42 A.L.R. 1243, 1244. (1926) for distinction between 
inherently and imminently dangerous. Cf. MacPherson v. Buick Motor 
Co., 217 N.Y. 382. 111 N.E. 1050, 1916F L.R.A. 696. 
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class of persons, who, he has reason to believe, will come into 
contact with the articles and who suffers injury because of its 
defective and dangerous condition.10 
Similarly, a like result would be attained by the adoption 
of the Restatement rule that: 
... one who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure 
or creates any other condition thereon is subject to liability . • . 
for bodily harm . . . after his work has been accepted • • . under 
the same rules as those . . . determining liability of one who as 
manufacturer ... makes a chattel. ... u 
The adoption of the Restatement rule would lead to the same test 
as applied by the court in the instant case. 
Denying the pleas of the defendant lumber company that its 
conduct was in conformity with the customs of the trade of the 
area, the court stated that there was sufficient evidence for the 
jury to find such conduct unreasonable. Customs and usages of 
the trade under the better view should always be required to 
meet the test of "learned reason."12 When a whole industry 
adopts careless methods in order to save time, effort, or expense, 
the standard is not conclusive, and conformity thereto is a cir-
cumstance to be weighed and considered with other circumstances 
in determining whether or not ordinary care has been exercised.13 
The determination of reasonableness is therefore left to the jury. 
The test as applied by the court was the proper one and 
there is sufficient basis for its application to future cases of a 
similar nature. 
Bob Baumfalk, '56 
